diff --git a/pages/CSE442T/CSE442T_L24.md b/pages/CSE442T/CSE442T_L24.md
index ccf1c5b..792ca34 100644
--- a/pages/CSE442T/CSE442T_L24.md
+++ b/pages/CSE442T/CSE442T_L24.md
@@ -2,4 +2,251 @@
 
 ## Continue on zero-knowledge proof
 
+Let $X=(G_0,G_1)$ and $y=\sigma$ permutation. $\sigma(G_0)=G_1$.
+
+$P$ is a random $\Pi$ permutation and $H=\Pi(G_0)$.
+
+$P$ sends $H$ to $V$.
+
+$V$ sends a random $b\in\{0,1\}$ to $P$.
+
+$P$ sends $\phi=\Pi$ if $b=0$ and $\phi=\Pi\phi^{-1}$ if $b=1$.
+
+$V$ outputs accept if $\phi(G_0)=G_1$ and reject otherwise.
+
+### Message transfer protocol
+
+The message transfer protocol is defined as follow.
+
+Construct a simulator $S(x,z)$ based on $V^*(x,z)$.
+
+Pick $b'\gets\{0,1\}$.
+
+$\Pi\gets \mathbb{P}_n$ and $H\gets \Pi(G_0)$.
+
+If $V^*$ sends $b=b'$, we send $\Pi$/ output $V^*$'s output
+
+Otherwise, we start over. Go back to the beginning state. Do this until "n" successive accept.'
+
+### Zero-knowledge definition (Cont.)
+
+In zero-knowledge definition. We need the simulator $S$ to have expected running time polynomial in $n$.
+
+Expected two trials for each "success"
+
+2*n running time (one interaction)
+
+$$
+\{Out_{V^*}[S(x,z)\leftrightarrow V^*(x,z)]\}=\{Out_{V^*}[P(x,y)\leftrightarrow V^*(x,z)]\}
+$$
+
+If $G_0$ and $G_1$ are indistinguishable, $H_s=\Pi(G_{b'})$ same distribution as $H_p=\Pi(G_0)$. (random permutation of $G_1$ is a random permutation of $G_0$)
+
+## Review
+
+### Assumptions used in cryptography (this course)
+
+#### Diffie-Hellman assumption
+
+The Diffie-Hellman assumption is that the following problem is hard.
+
+$$
+\text{Given } g,g^a,g^b\text{, it is hard to compute } g^{ab}.
+$$
+
+More formally,
+
+If $p$ is a randomly sampled safe prime.
+
+Denote safe prime as $\tilde{\Pi}_n=\{p\in \Pi_n:q=\frac{p-1}{2}\in \Pi_{n-1}\}$
+
+Then
+
+$$
+P\left[p\gets \tilde{\Pi_n};a\gets\mathbb{Z}_p^*;g=a^2\neq 1;x\gets \mathbb{Z}_q;y=g^x\mod p:\mathcal{A}(y)=x\right]\leq \varepsilon(n)
+$$
+
+$p\gets \tilde{\Pi_n};a\gets\mathbb{Z}_p^*;g=a^2\neq 1$ is the function condition when we do the encryption on cyclic groups.
+
+#### Discrete logarithm assumption
+
+> If Diffie-Hellman assumption holds, then discrete logarithm assumption holds.
+
+This is a corollary of the Diffie-Hellman assumption, it states as follows.
+
+This is collection of one-way functions
+
+$$
+p\gets \tilde\Pi_n(\textup{ safe primes }), p=2q+1
+$$
+$$
+a\gets \mathbb{Z}*_{p};g=a^2(\textup{ make sure }g\neq 1)
+$$
+$$
+f_{g,p}(x)=g^x\mod p
+$$
+$$
+f:\mathbb{Z}_q\to \mathbb{Z}^*_p
+$$
+
+#### RSA assumption
+
+The RSA assumption is that it is hard to factorize a product of two large primes. (no polynomial time algorithm for factorization product of two large primes with $n$ bits)
+
+Let $e$ be the exponents
+
+$$
+P[p,q\gets \Pi_n;N\gets p\cdot q;e\gets \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}^*;y\gets \mathbb{N}_n;x\gets \mathcal{A}(N,e,y);x^e=y\mod N]<\varepsilon(n)
+$$
+
+#### Factoring assumption
+
+> If RSA assumption holds, then factoring assumption holds.
+
+The only way to efficiently factorize the product of prime is to iterate all the primes.
+
+### Fancy product of these assumptions
+
+#### Trapdoor permutation
+
+> RSA assumption $\implies$ Trapdoor permutation exists.
+
+Idea: $f:D\to R$ is a one-way permutation.
+
+$y\gets R$.
+
+* Finding $x$ such that $f(x)=y$ is hard.
+* With some secret info about $f$, finding $x$ is easy.
+
+$\mathcal{F}=\{f_i:D_i\to R_i\}_{i\in I}$
+
+1. $\forall i,f_i$ is a permutation
+2. $(i,t)\gets Gen(1^n)$ efficient. ($i\in I$ paired with $t$), $t$ is the "trapdoor info"
+3. $\forall i,D_i$ can be sampled efficiently.
+4. $\forall i,\forall x,f_i(x)$ can be computed in polynomial time.
+5. $P[(i,t)\gets Gen(1^n);y\gets R_i:f_i(\mathcal{A}(1^n,i,y))=y]<\varepsilon(n)$ (note: $\mathcal{A}$ is not given $t$)
+6. (trapdoor) There is a p.p.t. $B$ such that given $i,y,t$, B always finds x such that $f_i(x)=y$. $t$ is the "trapdoor info"
+
+_There is one bit of trapdoor info that without it, finding $x$ is hard._
+
+#### Collision resistance hash function
+
+> If discrete logarithm assumption holds, then collision resistance hash function exists.
+
+Let $h: \{0, 1\}^{n+1} \to \{0, 1\}^n$ be a CRHF.
+
+Base on the discrete log assumption, we can construct a CRHF $H: \{0, 1\}^{n+1} \to \{0, 1\}^n$ as follows:
+
+$Gen(1^n):(g,p,y)$
+
+$p\in \tilde{\Pi}_n(p=2q+1)$
+
+$g$ generator for group of sequence $\mod p$ (G_q)
+
+$y$ is a random element in $G_q$
+
+$h_{g,p,y}(x,b)=y^bg^x\mod p$, $y^bg^x\mod p \in \{0,1\}^n$
+
+$g^x\mod p$ if $b=0$, $y\cdot g^x\mod p$ if $b=1$.
+
+Under the discrete log assumption, $H$ is a CRHF.
+
+- It is easy to sample $(g,p,y)$
+- It is easy to compute
+- Compressing by 1 bit
+
+#### One-way permutation
+
+> If trapdoor permutation exists, then one-way permutation exists.
+
+A one-way permutation is a function that is one-way and returns a permutation of the input.
+
+#### One-way function
+
+> If one-way permutation exists, then one-way function exists.
+
+One-way function is a class of functions that are easy to compute but hard to invert.
+
+##### Weak one-way function
+
+A weak one-way function is 
+
+$$
+f:\{0,1\}^n\to \{0,1\}^*
+$$
+
+1. $\exists$ a P.P.T. that computes $f(x),\forall x\in\{0,1\}^n$
+2. $\forall a$ adversaries, $\exists \varepsilon(n),\forall n$.
+
+$$
+P[x\gets \{0,1\}^n;y=f(x):f(a(y,1^n))=y]<1-\frac{1}{p(n)}
+$$
+_The probability of success should not be too close to 1_
+
+
+##### Strong one-way function
+
+> If weak one-way function exists, then strong one-way function exists.
+
+A strong one-way function is
+
+$$
+f:\{0,1\}^n\to \{0,1\}^*(n\to \infty)
+$$
+
+There is a negligible function $\varepsilon (n)$ such that for any adversary $a$ (n.u.p.p.t)
+
+$$
+P[x\gets\{0,1\}^n;y=f(x):f(a(y))=y,a(y)=x']\leq\varepsilon(n)
+$$
+
+_Probability of guessing correct message is negligible_
+
+#### Hard-core bits
+
+> Strong one-way function $\iff$ hard-core bits exists.
+
+A hard-core bit is a bit that is hard to predict given the output of a one-way function.
+
+#### Pseudorandom generator
+
+> If one-way permutation exists, then pseudorandom generator exists.
+
+We can also use pseudorandom generator to construct one-way function.
+
+And hard-core bits can be used to construct pseudorandom generator.
+
+#### Pseudorandom function
+
+> If pseudorandom generator exists, then pseudorandom function exists.
+
+A pseudorandom function is a function that is indistinguishable from a true random function.
+
+### Multi-message secure private-key encryption
+
+> If pseudorandom function exists, then multi-message secure private-key encryption exists.
+
+A multi-message secure private-key encryption is a function that is secure against an adversary who can see multiple messages.
+
+#### Single message secure private-key encryption
+
+> If multi-message secure private-key encryption exists, then single message secure private-key encryption exists.
+
+#### Message-authentication code
+
+> If pseudorandom function exists, then message-authentication code exists.
+
+
+### Public-key encryption
+
+> If Diffie-Hellman assumption holds, and Trapdoor permutation exists, then public-key encryption exists.
+
+### Digital signature
+
+#### One-time secure digital signature
+
+#### Fixed-length one-time secure digital signature
+
+> If one-way function exists, then fixed-length one-time secure digital signature exists.
+
 
diff --git a/pages/CSE442T/CSE442T_L4.md b/pages/CSE442T/CSE442T_L4.md
index 2ef450b..374c417 100644
--- a/pages/CSE442T/CSE442T_L4.md
+++ b/pages/CSE442T/CSE442T_L4.md
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ $\mu_a(n)>\frac{1}{n^c}$ for infinitely many $n$. or infinitely often.
 
 ## New materials
 
-### Week One-Way Function
+### Weak one-way function
 
 $f:\{0,1\}^n\to \{0,1\}^*$