update notations and fix typos
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@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ So $\mathcal{B}$ can break the discrete log assumption with non-negligible proba
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So $h$ is a CRHF.
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EOP
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QED
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To compress by more, say $h_k:{0,1}^n\to \{0,1\}^{n-k},k\geq 1$, then we can use $h: \{0,1\}^{n+1}\to \{0,1\}^n$ multiple times.
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@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ Case 1: $h_i(m_1)=h_i(m_2)$, Then $\mathcal{A}$ finds a collision of $h$.
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Case 2: $h_i(m_1)\neq h_i(m_2)$, Then $\mathcal{A}$ produced valid signature on $h_i(m_2)$ after only seeing $Sign'_{sk'}(m_1)\neq Sign'_{sk'}(m_2)$. This contradicts the one-time secure of ($Gen,Sign,Ver$).
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EOP
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QED
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### Many-time Secure Digital Signature
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