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+# CSE4303 Introduction to Computer Security (Exam Review)
+
+## Details
+
+Time and location
+
+– In class exam – Thursday, 3/5 at 11:30 AM
+– What is allowed:
+    - One 8.5” X 11” paper of notes, single-sided only, typed or hand-written
+
+Topics covered:
+
+– Security fundamentals
+– TCP/IP network stack
+– Crypto fundamentals
+– Symmetric key cryptography
+– Hash functions
+– Asymmetric key cryptography
+
+## Security fundamentals
+
+### Defining security
+
+- Understand principles of security analysis
+  - The security of a system, application, or protocol is always relative to
+    - A set of desired properties
+    - An adversary with specific capabilities ("threat model")
+
+### Key security concepts
+
+C.I.A. triad:
+
+- Integrity: Prevent unauthorized modification of data, and/or detect if modification occurred.
+  - ARP poisoning (ARP spoofing)
+  - Authentication codes
+- Confidentiality: Prevent unauthorized parties from learning the contents of data (in transit or at rest).
+  - Packet sniffing / eavesdropping
+  - Data encryption
+- Availability: Ensure systems and data are accessible to authorized users when needed.
+  - Denial-of-Service (DoS) / Distributed DoS (DDoS)
+  - Rate limiting + traffic filtering (often with DDoS protection/CDN)
+
+Other security goals:
+
+- Authenticity: identity of an entity (issuer of info/message) is verified
+- Anonymity: identity of an entity remains unknown
+- Non-repudiation: messages can't be denied or taken back (e.g. online transaction commitments)
+
+### Modeling attacks
+
+Common components:
+
+- System being attacked (usually a model, with assumptions and abstractions)
+- Threat model 
+- Attack surface: what can be attacked
+  - Open ports and exposed services
+  - Public APIs and their parameters
+  - Web endpoints, forms, cookies
+  - File system permissions
+  - Hardware interfaces (USB, JTAG)
+  - User roles and privilege boundaries
+- Attack vector: how the attacker attacks
+  - SQL injection via POST /login
+  - Phishing to steal credentials, then SSH login
+  - Buffer overflow in a network daemon
+  - Cross-site scripting through a comment field
+  - Supply-chain poisoning of a dependency
+- Vulnerability: what the attacker can do
+- Exploit: how the attacker exploits the vulnerability
+- Damage: what the attacker can do
+- Mitigation: mitigate vulnerability
+- Defense: close vulnerability gap
+
+Importance of correct modeling
+
+- Attack-surface awareness guides defenses
+  - E.g. pre-Covid-19 vs. post-Covid attack surface of company servers
+- Match resources to expected threat actors
+  - "Script kiddie": individual or group running off-the-shelf attacks
+    - Caveat: off-the-shelf attacks can still be quite powerful! Metasploit, Shodan, dark web market.
+  - "Insider attack": employee with access to internal machines/networks
+  - "Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)": nation-state level resources and patience
+  - All these threats have different motivations, require different defenses/responses!
+- Reevaluate often
+  - Threat capabilities change over time
+
+## TCP/IP network stack
+
+Local and interdomain routing
+
+- TCP/IP for routing and messaging
+- BGP for routing announcements
+
+Domain Name System
+
+- Find IP address from symbolic name (cse.wustl.edu)
+
+### Layer Summary
+
+Application: the actual sending message
+Transport (TCP, UDP): segment
+Network (IP): packet
+Data Link (Ethernet): frame
+
+### Types of Addresses in Internet
+
+- Media Access Control (MAC) addresses in the network access layer
+  - Associated w/ network interface card (NIC)
+  - 00-50-56-C0-00-01
+- IP addresses for the network layer
+  - IPv4 (32 bit) vs IPv6 (128 bit)
+  - 128.1.1.3 vs fe80::fc38:6673:f04d:b37b%4
+- IP addresses + ports for the transport layer
+  - E.g., 10.0.0.2:8080
+- Domain names for the application/human layer
+  - E.g., www.wustl.edu
+
+#### Routing and Translation of Addresses
+
+(All of them are attack surfaces)
+
+- Translation between IP addresses and MAC addresses
+  - Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) for IPv4
+  - Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) for IPv6
+- Routing with IP addresses
+  - TCP, UDP for connections, IP for routing packets
+  - Border Gateway Protocol for routing table updates
+- Translation between IP addresses and domain names
+  - Domain Name System (DNS)
+
+### Summary for security
+
+- Confidentiality
+  - Packet sniffing
+- Integrity
+  - ARP poisoning
+- Availability
+  - Denial of service attacks
+- Common
+  - Address translation poisoning attacks (DNS, ARP)
+  - Packet spoofing
+- Core protocols not designed for security
+  - Eavesdropping, packet injection, route stealing, DNS poisoning
+  - Patched over time to prevent basic attacks
+- More secure variants exist:
+  - IP $\to$ IPsec (IPsec is )
+  - DNS $\to$ DNSsec
+  - BGP $\to$ sBGP
+
+## Crypto fundamentals
+
+- Well-defined statement about difficulty of compromising a system
+  - ...with clear implicit or explicit assumptions about:
+    - Parameters of the system
+    - Threat model
+    - Attack surfaces
+- Example: "A one-time pad cipher is secure against any cryptanalysis, including a brute-force attack, assuming:
+  - the key is the same length as the plaintext,
+  - the key is truly random, and
+  - the key is never re-used."
+
+### Common roles in cryptography
+
+Alice and Bob: Sender and receiver
+
+Eve: Adversary that can see but not create any packets
+
+Mallory: Man in the middle, can create and modify packets
+
+The message M is called the **plaintext**.
+
+Alice will convert plaintext M to an encrypted form using an
+encryption algorithm E that outputs a **ciphertext*- C for M.
+
+#### Cryptography goals
+
+Confidentiality:
+
+- Mallory and Eve cannot recover original message from ciphertext
+
+Integrity:
+
+- Mallory cannot modify message from Alice to Bob without detection by Bob
+
+#### Threat models
+
+- Attacker may have (with increasing power):
+  - a) collection of ciphertexts (ciphertext-only attack)
+  - b) collection of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (known plaintext attack: KPA)
+  - c) collection of plaintext/ciphertext pairs for plaintexts selected by the attacker (chosen plaintext attack: CPA)
+  - d) collection of plaintext/ciphertext pairs for ciphertexts selected by the attacker (chosen ciphertext attack: CCA/CCA2)
+
+## Symmetric key cryptography
+
+### Classical cryptography
+
+Techniques: substitution and transposition
+
+- Substitution: 1:1 mapping of alphabet onto itself
+- Transposition: permutation of elements (i.e. rearrange letters)
+
+- Caesar cipher: rotate each letter by k positions (k is fixed)
+- Vigenère cipher: If length of key is known, split letters into groups based on index within key and do frequency analysis within groups
+
+> The three steps in cryptography:
+>
+> - Precisely specify threat model
+> - Propose a construction
+> - Prove that breaking construction under threat mode will solve an underlying hard problem
+
+#### Perfect secrecy
+
+Ciphertext attack reveal no "info" about plaintext under ciphertext only attack
+
+Def: A cipher $(E, D)$ over $(K, M, C)$ has perfect secrecy if
+
+- $\forall m_0, m_1 \in M$ $(|m_0| = |m_1|)$ and $\forall c \in C$,
+  - $\Pr[E(k, m_0) = c] = \Pr[E(k, m_1) = c]$ where $k \leftarrow K$
+
+#### XOR One-time pad (perfect secrecy)
+
+Assumptions:
+
+- Key is as long as message
+- Key is random
+- Key is never re-used
+
+In practice, relax this assumption gets "Stream ciphers"
+
+### Stream cipher
+
+- Use pseudorandom generator as keystream for xore encryption (security is guaranteed by pseudorandom generator)
+
+Security abstraction:
+
+1. XOR transfers randomness of keystream to randomness of CT regardless of PT’s content
+2. Security depends on G being “practically” indistinguishable from random string and “practically” unpredictable
+3. Idea: shouldn’t be able to predict next bit of generator given all bits seen so far
+
+#### Semantic security
+
+- $(E, D)$ has semantic secrecy if $\forall m_0, m_1 \in M$ $(|m_0| = |m_1|)$,
+  - $\{E(k, m_0)\} \approx_p \{E(k, m_1)\}$ where $k \leftarrow K$
+- ...and the adversary exhibits $m_0, m_1 \in M$ explicitly
+
+The advantage of adversary is defined as the probability of distinguishing $E(k, m_0)$ from $E(k, m_1)$.
+
+#### Weakness for stream ciphers
+
+- Week pseudorandom generator
+- Key re-use
+- Predicable effect of modifying ciphertext or decrypted plaintext.
+
+### Block cipher
+
+View cipher as a Pseudo-Random Permutation (PRP)
+
+#### Pseudorandom permutation
+
+- PRP defined over $(K, X)$:
+  - $E: K \times X \to X$
+  - such that:
+    1. There exists an "efficient" deterministic algorithm to evaluate $E(k, x)$.
+    2. The function $E(k, \cdot)$ is one-to-one.
+    3. There exists an "efficient" inversion algorithm $D(k, y)$.
+
+- i.e. a PRF that is an invertible one-to-one mapping from message space to message space
+
+#### Security of block ciphers
+
+Intuition: a PRP is secure if: a random function in $Perms[X]$ is indistinguishable from a random function in $SF$ (real random permutation function)
+
+The adversarial game is to let adversary decide $x$, then we choose random key $k$ and give $E(k,x)$ and real random permutation $Perm(X)$ to let adversary decide which is which.
+
+#### Block cipher constructions: Feistel network
+
+Forward network:
+
+![Feistel network](https://notenextra.trance-0.com/CSE4303/Feistel_network.png)
+
+- Forward (round $i$): given $(L_{i-1}, R_{i-1}) \in \{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^n$,
+  - $L_i = R_{i-1}$
+  - $R_i = L_{i-1} \oplus f_i(R_{i-1})$
+
+- Proof (construct the inverse):
+  - Suppose we are given the output of round $i$, namely $(L_i, R_i)$.
+  - Recover the previous right half immediately:
+    - $R_{i-1} = L_i$
+  - Then recover the previous left half by undoing the XOR:
+    - $L_{i-1} = R_i \oplus f_i(R_{i-1}) = R_i \oplus f_i(L_i)$
+  - Therefore each round map is invertible, with inverse transformation:
+    - $R_{i-1} = L_i$
+    - $L_{i-1} = f_i(L_i) \oplus R_i$
+  - Applying this inverse for $i=d,d-1,\ldots,1$ recovers $(L_0,R_0)$ from $(L_d,R_d)$, so the whole Feistel network $F$ is invertible.
+
+- Notation sketch (each wire is $n$ bits):
+  - Input: $(L_0, R_0)$
+  - Rounds:
+    - $L_1 = R_0,\ \ R_1 = L_0 \oplus f_1(R_0)$
+    - $L_2 = R_1,\ \ R_2 = L_1 \oplus f_2(R_1)$
+    - $\cdots$
+    - $L_d = R_{d-1},\ \ R_d = L_{d-1} \oplus f_d(R_{d-1})$
+  - Output: $(L_d, R_d)$
+
+## Hash functions
+
+## Asymmetric key cryptography
+
+## Appendix for additional algorithms and methods
+
+### Feistel network (used by several items below)
+
+A **Feistel network*- splits a block into left/right halves and iterates rounds of the form $(L_{i+1},R_{i+1})=(R_i, L_i\oplus F(R_i,K_i))$, so decryption reuses the same structure with subkeys in reverse order.
+
+Feistel-based here: **DES, 3DES, CAMELLIA, SEED, GOST 28147-89 (and thus GOST89MAC uses a Feistel block cipher internally).**
+
+### A) Cipherlist *filters / set operations- (not crypto primitives)
+
+These don’t implement encryption or authentication; they just include/exclude suites.
+
+- **COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT*- — (selection) picks suites in `ALL` that are not enabled by default (notably RC4/anonymous, depending on build).
+- **ALL*- — (selection) all suites except `eNULL`, in a default preference order (OpenSSL-defined ordering).
+- **COMPLEMENTOFALL*- — (selection) suites excluded from `ALL` (currently `eNULL`).
+- **HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW*- — (selection) groups suites by effective key strength class (OpenSSL policy buckets).
+- **TLSv1.2 / TLSv1.0 / SSLv3*- — (selection) restricts to suites whose *minimum supported protocol version- is at least that value.
+- **SUITEB128 / SUITEB128ONLY / SUITEB192*- — (selection) enforces “Suite B”-style constraints: only very specific ECDHE-ECDSA-AES-GCM suites and curves/hashes.
+- **CBC*- — (mode selector) selects suites using **CBC mode*- for symmetric encryption (confidentiality only unless paired with a MAC).
+
+---
+
+### B) “No encryption” / “no authentication” flags
+
+- **eNULL, NULL*- — **encryption/decryption: none**; **cipher method: N/A**; core idea: the record payload is not encrypted at all (plaintext).
+- **aNULL*- — **authentication: none*- (no peer authentication); **cipher method: N/A**; core idea: uses anonymous key agreement (no cert/signature), enabling MITM.
+- **ADH / AECDH*- — **authentication: none**; **cipher method: N/A**; core idea: anonymous (EC)DH establishes a shared secret but without identity binding → MITM-friendly.
+
+---
+
+### C) Key exchange and authentication selectors (not symmetric encryption, not MAC)
+
+These describe *how keys are negotiated- and/or *how the peer is authenticated*, not whether payload is a block/stream cipher.
+
+#### RSA / DH / ECDH families
+
+- **kRSA, RSA*- — (key exchange) the premaster secret is sent encrypted under the server’s RSA public key (classic TLS RSA KX).
+- **aRSA, aECDSA, aDSS, aGOST, aGOST01*- — (authentication) the server identity is proven via a certificate signature scheme (RSA / ECDSA / DSA / GOST).
+- **kDHr, kDHd, kDH*- — (key exchange) *static- DH key agreement using DH certificates (obsolete/removed in newer OpenSSL).
+- **kDHE, kEDH, DH / DHE, EDH / ECDHE, EECDH / kEECDH, kECDHE, ECDH*- — (key exchange) *ephemeral- (EC)DH derives a fresh shared secret each handshake; “authenticated” variants bind it to a cert/signature.
+- **aDH*- — (authentication selector) indicates DH-authenticated suites (DH certs; also removed in newer OpenSSL).
+
+#### PSK family
+
+- **PSK*- — (keying model) uses a pre-shared secret as the authentication/secret basis.
+- **kPSK, kECDHEPSK, kDHEPSK, kRSAPSK*- — (key exchange) PSK combined with (EC)DHE or RSA to derive/transport session keys.
+- **aPSK*- — (authentication) PSK itself authenticates endpoints (except RSA_PSK where cert auth may be involved).
+
+---
+
+### D) Symmetric encryption / AEAD (this is where “block vs stream” applies)
+
+#### AES family
+
+- **AES128 / AES256 / AES*- — **encryption/decryption**; **block cipher**; core algorithm: AES is an SPN (substitution–permutation network) of repeated SubBytes/ShiftRows/MixColumns/AddRoundKey rounds.
+- **AESGCM*- — **both encryption + message authentication (AEAD)**; **both*- (AES block cipher used in counter mode + auth); core algorithm: encrypt with AES-CTR and authenticate with GHASH over ciphertext/AAD to produce a tag.
+- **AESCCM / AESCCM8*- — **both encryption + message authentication (AEAD)**; **both**; core algorithm: compute CBC-MAC then encrypt with CTR mode, with 16-byte vs 8-byte tag length variants.
+
+#### ARIA family
+
+- **ARIA128 / ARIA256 / ARIA*- — **encryption/decryption**; **block cipher**; core algorithm: ARIA is an SPN-style block cipher with byte-wise substitutions and diffusion layers across rounds.
+
+#### CAMELLIA family
+
+- **CAMELLIA128 / CAMELLIA256 / CAMELLIA*- — **encryption/decryption**; **block cipher**; core algorithm: Camellia is a **Feistel network*- with round functions plus extra FL/FL$^{-1}$ layers for nonlinearity and diffusion. *(Feistel: yes)*
+
+#### ChaCha20
+
+- **CHACHA20*- — **encryption/decryption**; **stream cipher**; core algorithm: ChaCha20 generates a keystream via repeated ARX (add-rotate-xor) quarter-rounds on a 512-bit state and XORs it with plaintext.
+
+#### DES / 3DES
+
+- **DES*- — **encryption/decryption**; **block cipher**; core algorithm: DES is a 16-round **Feistel network*- using expansion, S-boxes, and permutations. *(Feistel: yes)*
+- **3DES*- — **encryption/decryption**; **block cipher**; core algorithm: applies DES three times (EDE or EEE) to increase effective security while retaining the **Feistel*- DES core. *(Feistel: yes)*
+
+#### RC4
+
+- **RC4*- — **encryption/decryption**; **stream cipher**; core algorithm: maintains a 256-byte permutation and produces a keystream byte-by-byte that is XORed with plaintext.
+
+#### RC2 / IDEA / SEED
+
+- **RC2*- — **encryption/decryption**; **block cipher**; core algorithm: mixes key-dependent operations (adds, XORs, rotates) across rounds with “mix” and “mash” steps (not Feistel).
+- **IDEA*- — **encryption/decryption**; **block cipher**; core algorithm: combines modular addition, modular multiplication, and XOR in a Lai–Massey-like structure to achieve diffusion/nonlinearity (not Feistel).
+- **SEED*- — **encryption/decryption**; **block cipher**; core algorithm: a 16-round **Feistel network*- with nonlinear S-box-based round functions. *(Feistel: yes)*
+
+---
+
+### E) Hash / MAC / digest selectors (message authentication side)
+
+These are not “ciphers” but are used for integrity/authentication (often as HMAC, PRF, signatures).
+
+- **MD5*- — **message authentication component*- (typically via HMAC, historically); **cipher method: N/A**; core algorithm: iterated Merkle–Damgård hash compressing 512-bit blocks into a 128-bit digest (now considered broken for collision resistance).
+- **SHA1, SHA*- — **message authentication component*- (typically HMAC-SHA1 historically); **N/A**; core algorithm: Merkle–Damgård hash producing 160-bit output via 80-step compression (collisions known).
+- **SHA256 / SHA384*- — **message authentication component*- (HMAC / TLS PRF / signatures); **N/A**; core algorithm: SHA-2 family Merkle–Damgård hashes with different word sizes/output lengths (256-bit vs 384-bit).
+- **GOST94*- — **message authentication component*- (HMAC based on GOST R 34.11-94); **N/A**; core algorithm: builds an HMAC tag by hashing inner/outer padded key with the message using the GOST hash.
+- **GOST89MAC*- — **message authentication**; **block-cipher-based MAC (so “block” internally)**; core algorithm: computes a MAC using the GOST 28147-89 block cipher in a MAC mode (cipher-based chaining). *(Feistel internally via GOST 28147-89)*
diff --git a/content/CSE4303/_meta.js b/content/CSE4303/_meta.js
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@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ export default {
     "---":{
         type: 'separator'
     },
+    CSE4303_E1: "Exam review",
     CSE4303_L1: "Introduction to Computer Security (Lecture 1)",
     CSE4303_L2: "Introduction to Computer Security (Lecture 2)",
     CSE4303_L3: "Introduction to Computer Security (Lecture 3)",
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