NoteNextra-origin/content/CSE442T/CSE442T_L18.md

CSE442T Lecture 18

Chapter 5: Authentication

5.1 Introduction

Signatures

private key

Alice and Bob share a secret key k.

Message Authentication Codes (MACs)

public key

Any one can verify the signature.

Digital Signatures

Definitions 134.1

A message authentication codes (MACs) is a triple (Gen, Tag, Ver) where

• k\gets Gen(1^k) is a p.p.t. algorithm that takes as input a security parameter k and outputs a key k.
• \sigma\gets Tag_k(m) is a p.p.t. algorithm that takes as input a key k and a message m and outputs a tag \sigma.
• Ver_k(m, \sigma) is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a key k, a message m, and a tag \sigma and outputs "Accept" if \sigma is a valid tag for m under k and "Reject" otherwise.

For all n\in\mathbb{N}, all m\in\mathcal{M}_n.

P[k\gets Gen(1^k):Ver_k(m, Tag_k(m))=\textup {``Accept''}]=1

Definition 134.2 (Security of MACs)

Security: Prevent an adversary from producing any accepted (m, \sigma) pair that they haven't seen before.

• Assume they have seen some history of signed messages. (m_1, \sigma_1), (m_2, \sigma_2), \ldots, (m_q, \sigma_q).
• Adversary \mathcal{A} has oracle access to Tag_k. Goal is to produce a new (m, \sigma) pair that is accepted but none of (m_1, \sigma_1), (m_2, \sigma_2), \ldots, (m_q, \sigma_q).

\forall n.u.p.p.t. adversary \mathcal{A} with oracle access to Tag_k(\cdot),

\Pr[k\gets Gen(1^k);(m, \sigma)\gets\mathcal{A}^{Tag_k(\cdot)}(1^k);\mathcal{A}\textup{ did not query }m \textup{ and } Ver_k(m, \sigma)=\textup{``Accept''}]<\epsilon(n)

MACs scheme

F=\{f_s\} is a PRF family.

f_s:\{0,1\}^{|S|}\to\{0,1\}^{|S|}

Gen(1^k): s\gets \{0,1\}^n

Tag_k(m) outputs f_s(m).

Ver_s(m, \sigma) outputs "Accept" if f_s(m)=\sigma and "Reject" otherwise.

Proof of security (Outline):

Suppose we used F\gets RF_n (true random function).

If \mathcal{A} wants F(m) for m\in \{m_1, \ldots, m_q\}. F(m)\gets U_n.

\begin{aligned}
&P[F\gets RF_n; (m, \sigma)\gets\mathcal{A}^{F(\cdot)}(1^k);\mathcal{A}\textup{ did not query }m \textup{ and } Ver_k(m, \sigma)=\textup{``Accept''}]\\
&=P[F\gets RF_n; (m, \sigma)\gets F(m)]\\
&=\frac{1}{2^n}<\epsilon(n)
\end{aligned}

Suppose an adversary \mathcal{A} has \frac{1}{p(n)} chance of success with our PRF-based scheme...

This could be used to distinguish PRF f_s from a random function.

The distinguisher runs as follows:

• Runs \mathcal{A}(1^n)
• Whenever \mathcal{A} asks for Tag_k(m), we ask our oracle for f(m)
• (m, \sigma)\gets\mathcal{A}^{F(\cdot)}(1^n)
• Query oracle for f(m)
• If \sigma=f(m), output 1
• Otherwise, output 0

D will output 1 for PRF with probability \frac{1}{p(n)} and for RF with probability \frac{1}{2^n}.

Definition 135.1(Digital Signature D.S. over \{M_n\}_n)

A digital signature scheme is a triple (Gen, Sign, Ver) where

• (pk,sk)\gets Gen(1^k) is a p.p.t. algorithm that takes as input a security parameter k and outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk.
• \sigma\gets Sign_{sk}(m) is a p.p.t. algorithm that takes as input a secret key sk and a message m and outputs a signature \sigma.
• Ver_{pk}(m, \sigma) is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a public key pk, a message m, and a signature \sigma and outputs "Accept" if \sigma is a valid signature for m under pk and "Reject" otherwise.

For all n\in\mathbb{N}, all m\in\mathcal{M}_n.

P[(pk,sk)\gets Gen(1^k); \sigma\gets Sign_{sk}(m); Ver_{pk}(m, \sigma)=\textup{``Accept''}]=1

Security of Digital Signature

P[(pk,sk)\gets Gen(1^k); (m, \sigma)\gets\mathcal{A}^{Sign_{sk}(\cdot)}(1^k);\mathcal{A}\textup{ did not query }m \textup{ and } Ver_{pk}(m, \sigma)=\textup{``Accept''}]<\epsilon(n)

For all n.u.p.p.t. adversary \mathcal{A} with oracle access to Sign_{sk}(\cdot).

5.4 One time security: \mathcal{A} can only use oracle once.

Output (m, \sigma) if m\neq m

Security parameter n

One time security on \{0,1\}^n

One time security on \{0,1\}^*

Regular security on \{0,1\}^*

Note: the adversary automatically has access to Ver_{pk}(\cdot)

One time security scheme (Lamport Scheme on \{0,1\}^n)

Gen(1^k): \mathbb{Z}_n random n-bit string

sk: List 0: \bar{x_1}^0, \bar{x_2}^0, \ldots, \bar{x_n}^0

List 1: \bar{x_1}^1, \bar{x_2}^1, \ldots, \bar{x_n}^1

All \bar{x_i}^j\in\{0,1\}^n

pk: For a strong one-way function f

List 0: f(\bar{x_1}^0), f(\bar{x_2}^0), \ldots, f(\bar{x_n}^0)

List 1: f(\bar{x_1}^1), f(\bar{x_2}^1), \ldots, f(\bar{x_n}^1)

Sign_{sk}(m):(m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_n)\mapsto(\bar{x_1}^{m_1}, \bar{x_2}^{m_2}, \ldots, \bar{x_n}^{m_n})

Ver_{pk}(m, \sigma): output "Accept" if \sigma is a prefix of f(m) and "Reject" otherwise.

Example: When we sign a message 01100, Sign_{sk}(01100)=(\bar{x_1}^0, \bar{x_2}^1, \bar{x_3}^1, \bar{x_4}^0, \bar{x_5}^0) We only reveal the x_1^0, x_2^1, x_3^1, x_4^0, x_5^0 For the second signature, we need to reveal exactly different bits.
The adversary can query the oracle for f(0^n) (reveals list0) and f(1^n) (reveals list1) to produce any valid signature they want.